The question of how to allocate power between managers and shareholders, while intensely debated, remains unresolved among scholars and policymakers. This paper contributes to this debate by formally investigating the optimal allocation of power for shareholders recognizing that they may be heterogeneous, and that agency problems exist with managers. In the model, I treat shareholders as economic actors who choose decision rules (or the degree of management insulation) under a veil of ignorance with the goal of maximizing their utility. Managers choose their consumption of private benefits based on the insulation levels chosen by shareholders. I demonstrate that shareholders face a trade-off when choosing the level of managerial power. High insulation is desirable because it prevents other minority shareholders from blocking potentially profitable investments. Low insulation is desirable because it prevents other shareholders from approving potentially unprofitable investments, as well as reducing agency costs. I discuss how optimal insulation changes if we relax assumptions about shareholder heterogeneity and the presence of agency costs. I also demonstrate how the optimal solution differs from the efficient solution.
Introduction
The traditional characterization of shareholders of a corporation as a like-minded group of pro…t-maximizing individuals has come under recent scrutiny. Shareholders can vary on a number of dimensions. For example, shareholders may have di¤er-ent information and beliefs about the future, di¤erent investing horizons, di¤erent investment preferences, di¤erent investment portfolios and di¤erent political beliefs.
The recognition that shareholders may not be a monolithic group with the same set of interests has important implications for theories of corporate governance and organizational form. How might shareholders structure corporate governance rules if they want specialized management and minimal managerial agency costs, as well as protection from one another? What organizational mechanisms can be utilized to deal with shareholder disputes over …rm decisions?
In this paper, I provide a formal model to explain how the existence of shareholder heterogeneity and managerial agency costs impacts the optimal allocation of power among shareholders, and between shareholders and managers of a corporation. In approaching the shareholders' problem, I assume an explicitly contractarian view of the …rm. According to this view, corporate charters and default rules should be a re ‡ection of an agreement freely reached by shareholders designed to maximize each shareholder's welfare. To make this tractable, I assume that shareholders reach agreements about corporate governance rules under a veil of ignorance (Benz and rules. In addition, rules can be crafted that take the interests of all shareholders into account rather than prioritizing one set of shareholders over another.
I model power within a corporation as the shareholder voteshare necessary to gain approval of a managerial investment proposal. I demonstrate how shareholders design rules to protect themselves from each other. Speci…cally, heterogeneous shareholders face a trade-o¤ in deciding on voting rules to constrain shareholder behavior. In the event they are in favor of an investment, shareholders would like to minimize their ability to veto a project. In the event they are against an investment, shareholders would like to maximize their veto power. The optimal voting rule balances these two
considerations.
An analysis which takes shareholder heterogeneity into account thus provides an alternative explanation as to why private corporations may need to go public. As a corporation grows, so do the number of shareholders as well as the potential for shareholder con ‡ict. As the number of shareholders grows, the ability of shareholders to resolve con ‡ict becomes increasingly infeasible due to rising costs of negotiations, and the corporation is stymied from making investments. Shareholder con ‡ict gives rise to investment gridlock. It is still better though from an ex-ante perspective, for shareholders who cannot sell their shares to face the possibility of gridlock than welfare-decreasing investments. As a result shareholders will choose to maintain a reasonable amount of power for themselves.
In these circumstances, introducing a mechanism which allows unhappy share-holders to exit from their investment in the corporation is unequivocally better for all shareholders. I show that heterogeneous shareholders take into account their ability to sell in designing corporate governance rules; speci…cally they will act to limit shareholder power. When shareholders who disagree with management investment proposals can easily and relatively costlessly sell their shares to others who would bene…t from such investments, they no longer have to face the risk of other shareholders approving a welfare-decreasing investment. Shareholders who agree with managers are better o¤ because they no longer face a potential veto from unhappy shareholders. In essence, shareholders can sort among themselves to invest in corporations in which they agree with managerial decisions. Overall, corporations will be able to make more investments, and aggregate shareholder welfare goes up.
Even when shareholders have access to a liquid market however, they will maintain some power for themselves. In addition to intra-shareholder con ‡ict, shareholders must also recognize the possibility that managers will behave opportunistically, consuming private bene…ts that decreases the welfare of every shareholder. The design of power-sharing rules is important because the extent of opportunistic behavior (or agency costs) depends directly on how much power shareholders grant to managers. The more power shareholders give to managers, the higher agency costs will be. Again, shareholders face a trade-o¤. To control agency costs, shareholders would like to give as little power as possible to managers. However, maintaining power for themselves increases the likelihood of shareholder veto of management proposals. I
show that shareholders choose power-sharing rules to balance these two considerations. Shareholders will allocate less power to managers when agency costs are positive. This result holds regardless of whether shareholders are able to easily sell their shares or not.
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that some readers may object that the model presented below does not fully capture the actual governance of corporations. Corporate decisions are generally not made by shareholders. Instead, power to manage the corporation is vested in the board of directors. Nor do shareholders always vote on an informed basis. Instead, shareholders frequently delegate their voting power to investment managers and proxy advisors.
Aside from the fact that in many private corporations, shareholders do vote in their capacity as shareholders and serve on the board of directors, I would argue that institutional features of corporate decision-making and investing are not central to the fundamental question of shareholder power. Rather, they are solutions to problems such as shareholder collection action and the existence of informational asymmetries between managers and shareholders, that prevent shareholders from properly exercising their power (Clark 1986 ). Once we understand the power-sharing arrangement shareholders would like to implement, then we can ask whether the design of institutional mechanisms such as boards or the delegation of shareholder voting to third party representatives is e¤ective in achieving shareholders wishes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the existing debate over power-sharing arrangements in corporations. Section 3 lays out the basic model of shareholder power when shareholders can't sell their shares. In Section 4, I demonstrate how the results change once we assume that shareholders have access to liquid markets. Section 5 provides an illustrative example and Section 6 concludes.
The optimal allocation of power between shareholders and managers of corporations is a hotly debated topic among scholars and policy makers. The recent regulatory trend has drifted in favor of enhanced shareholder rights and correspondingly, diminished managerial power. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 gives shareholders the right to a non-binding vote on executive compensation ("say on pay"). 1 The Securities and Exchange Commission is in the midst of adopting rules giving certain shareholders the right to nominate directors on the company's proxy. 2 In addition, over the past …ve years, many companies have switched from a plurality voting standard for the election of directors, to one requiring that a majority of shareholders vote in favor of a nominee before that nominee can be elected to the board. For example, between 2005 and 2007 the number of S&P 100 companies with majority voting rules increased from nine to eighty-one. 3 In spite of these signi…cant advances towards greater shareholder involvement in corporate a¤airs, the bene…ts of such activism remains unclear. Corporate governance arrangements are set in response to exogenous, often unobservable variables, making it di¢ cult to empirically assess whether particular governance characteristics positively or negatively impact corporate performance. More concerning still is the fact that there continues to be intense theoretical disagreements as to the desir-1 Section 951, Dodd-Frank Act. 2 See New Exchange Act Rule 14a-11. Under the rules, shareholders will be eligible to have their nominees included in the proxy materials if they own at least 3 percent of the company's shares continuously for at least the prior three years. Authorization for the SEC to draft such rules is contained in Section 971, Dodd-Frank Act. 3 Kahan and Rock (2010).
ability of enhanced shareholder rights, with proponents and opponents emphasizing di¤erent aspects of corporate governance.
The main advocate in favor of enhanced shareholder rights is Professor Lucian
Bebchuk, who has argued in an in ‡uential series of papers that managers will have greater incentives to act in the best interests of shareholders if shareholders can proactively and cost-e¤ectively act to limit agency costs. He argues that boards of directors do not have the incentive to properly act on behalf of shareholders by virtue of the way they are nominated and elected. Shareholders can only credibly assert more power if they have the legal means and economic incentives to do so, and thus advocates for changes in state and federal laws enabling shareholders to change the charter and bylaws of the corporation to introduce rules more favorable to the exercise of shareholder power (Bebchuk 1989; 2005; , and that give shareholders the right to nominate directors to the board in the company's proxy to make a normative case in favor of empowering the board of directors and disem-powering shareholders. The basic argument 4 is that minimizing shareholder input reduces the likelihood and extent of intra-shareholder con ‡ict and opportunistic behavior. Centralizing power with the board and minimizing shareholder input is desirable because directors can sort through competing interests of shareholders to reach an optimal decision about corporate strategy that maximizes the welfare of (at least some) shareholders. This is the case even where agency costs are higher as a result.
Opponents of increased shareholder power believe that separation between ownership and control is necessary because the value of e¢ cient decision-making through a system of centralized power outweighs the reduction in corporate value from the consumption of private bene…ts and perquisites by managers. Agency costs are just an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of this superior institutional arrangement.
Proponents and opponents of increasing shareholder power focus on di¤erent issues. For Bebchuck, the need to control agency costs outweighs concerns about e¢ ciency of decision-making. For others, such as , the importance of centralized decisionmaking as a means to overcome shareholder con ‡ict outweighs the higher incidence of agency costs. Bebchuk argues that shareholder con ‡ict is not 4 It is important to note that there is disagreement amongst opponents of increased shareholder power. Several commentators (Blair and Stout 1999; Lipton and Rosenblum 1991) justify their stance on the basis that the purpose of corporations is not to maximize shareholder welfare, but rather to maximize the welfare of all corporate constituents (Blair and Stout 1991) , or the economic viability of the …rm (Lipton and Rosenblum 1991) . In this paper, I engage mainly with arguments of those who prioritize shareholder interests over other interest groups because this is the dominant paradigm in corporate law today. The model presented below however can be reinterpreted to consider how to design corporate governance rules for the bene…t of a more diverse set of consituents. Although my focus is on shareholder heterogeneity, the same type of analysis would apply as soon as one takes into acount the interests of other groups. The key di¤erence in the analysis will be the issue of whether it is possible for other constituents to exit their corporate investments. It is much easier for example, for a shareholder to simply sell her shares, than it is for an employee to change jobs, or for a community to attain geographical distance from a corporation. Concerns about gridlock in corporate decision-making then, will be especially salient.
very large while Bainbridge in turn argues that the market will take care of agency costs (shareholders will sell, managers will get …red). In this paper, I take seriously both positions and investigate how shareholders would deal with con ‡ict and agency costs in deciding on power allocation in circumstances where there is an accessible market for shares and where there is not.
While there has been a vast literature beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency costs within …rms, it is only recently that scholars have begun to discuss the ways in which shareholders in public corporations might di¤er from one another.
There are several potential sources of shareholder heterogeneity. Much discussed is the fact that in general, shareholders will not all share the same time preferences or the same discount rate ( Bebchuk uses two main arguments to overcome criticisms about the dangers of expanding shareholder rights when not all shareholders share the same goals. First, regarding time preferences, he argues …rst that market e¢ ciency should eradicate any di¤erences between shareholders, since e¢ ciency requires that current stock prices re ‡ect the long-run value of any corporate strategy. Second, even if markets aren't completely e¢ cient (a notion that must be taken seriously given evidence that stock prices fall victim to bubbles, that asset prices do not always re ‡ect underlying fundamental values and that investors are not always purely rational in their trading strategies 5 ), he asserts that in actual fact the majority of shareholders do share the same preferences. Because under his proposals a majority of shareholders are needed to approve any changes or elect directors, he argues that motivated minority shareholders won't be able to garner adequate support from other shareholders to enact their preferred course of action in the event it is not in the best interests of majority investors. Unfortunately, we have very little empirical data on the degree of similarity or di¤erences among shareholders. In the absence of this data, it is unclear why Bebchuk chooses a majority voting threshold, rather than a supermajority one or otherwise.
While most of the debate about shareholder power has focused on public corpo-rations, there has been recognition of the possibility of shareholder con ‡ict in private corporations. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) consider how potential con ‡icts among shareholders will alter the governance arrangements in closely held corporations. For them, it is the very fact that shareholders are locked into an investment that leads them to disagree over such policies such as dividend distribution and employee compensation. Once shareholders have access to a liquid market, all di¤erences are smoothed away, and shareholders no longer need to be concerned with issues of minority oppression. The traditional view is that it is the absence of a liquid market which creates con ‡ict in the …rst place.
Shareholders in close corporations protect themselves from wealth-reducing outcomes by instituting high voting and quorum requirements and using employment contracts that ensure minority consent to corporate actions, even though these mechanisms give rise to the potential for shareholder deadlock. ( Acknowledging that shareholders may be heterogeneous, and treating those het-erogeneous preferences as legitimate 6 , requires us to shift from examining the optimal voting rules for an individual (representative) shareholder to optimization for the entire group of shareholders. Political economists have long considered the problem of how to design voting rules when individual constituents do not all share the same policy preferences. Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) groundbreaking analysis on voting rules explicitly took individual con ‡ict as a given, and placed the individual, free to make choices, at the center of decision making about the kinds of voting rules to implement. These authors recognized that individuals will weigh up the bene…ts and costs of a particular voting rule (for example, requiring supermajorities makes it easier to block disfavored policies, but less likely that favored policies will be implemented), and will agree to implementation of a rule only when the bene…ts outweigh the costs, even in circumstances where that individual is sometimes disadvantaged under the rule. 7 Once we move away from the idea that all shareholders share the same preferences, then taking seriously the criteria of shareholder primacy and equality requires us to take the interests of all shareholders into account, not prioritizing one shareholder over another (other than through the mechanism of disproportional ownership). With di¤ering preferences, in order to make the goal of equality tractable, we have to consider the preferences and utility of the average shareholder. As Curtis 6 Note that I abstract here from agency problems that exist between some institutional investors and their members. It may well be that members (the principals) want the corporation to maximize its value, but their investment manager (the agent) has other goals. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that members share the same goals of the institutional investor. I do not deal with these kinds of agency problems in this paper. 7 See also Niemi and Weisberg (ed. 1972), for discussions about possible normative criterion for decision rules and voting standards.
(1972) points out, as soon as we drop the assumption that everyone is the same, we must start prioritizing optimization of aggregate group utility over individual utility.
Thus we can maintain the familiar norm of prioritizing shareholders as the residual claimants on a corporation, while allowing them to vary in their preferences.
The model I present below builds on a paper by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) who focus on the trade-o¤s faced by citizen-voters in a polity who do not know their own preferences ex ante. Speci…cally, these voters must design a rule that maximizes their well-being while understanding the bene…ts of entrenching rulers, as well as the risks of expropriation from such entrenchment. The probability of desirable reforms being enacted, as well as the risk of expropriation depends on the level of leader insulation chosen by voters. I extend Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi's model in two key ways. First, I adapt it to a corporate setting and endogenize the the leader's (CEO) bene…t: that is, I demonstrate how the level of private bene…t consumed by managers will depend directly on the rules chosen by shareholders. In this way, my model can capture dynamics associated with both shareholder con ‡ict and with agency costs. Second, I recognize that unlike citizens in a state, shareholders of a public corporation can easily exit from their investment. The di¢ culty of dealing with shareholder con ‡ict merely through voting rules and other mechanisms provides an impetus to change key features of the organization (ie, introducing an ability to leave). Therefore it is the case that the design of optimal power-sharing rules both depends on the existing institutional characteristics as well as being a determinant of them.
Shareholder Power in an Illiquid Market
Consider an economy consisting of risk-neutral shareholders 8 show that it is optimal for shareholders to have limited power, then this would suggest that we should not be nearly as concerned with providing mechanisms allowing for shareholder representation on boards.
Homogeneous Shareholders
For simplicity and exposition, …rst consider an environment where shareholders all share the same preferences. Each shareholder has a type . In the event the invest-ment is approved, each shareholder receives a payo¤ b, and 0 otherwise. 9 The timing of the game is:
1. Shareholders determine the degree of shareholder power V .
2. The CEO makes an investment proposal, and decides on the extent of her consumption of the private bene…t b.
3. Shareholders approve or block the investment proposal. Shareholders and CEO receive their payo¤s.
Since shareholders have complete information at the time of voting, and since shareholders share the same preferences, the question of the optimal degree of shareholder power becomes largely trivial. Shareholder power could be set at a very low level, but investments will never be approved if all shareholders don't bene…t.
Likewise, shareholder power could be very high, yet still the same proposals will be blocked. So long as a quorum of shareholders is able to vote, shareholders will be indi¤erent as to the rules about voting because the choice of V has no impact on shareholder welfare.
Shareholder homogeneity does place constraints on the size of the private bene…t able to be consumed by the CEO -in this simple model, b cannot be larger than or else all shareholders will oppose the investment -but the degree of shareholder power will have no bearing on the size of private bene…t consumed by the CEO. 9 Since we can always solve the model using a representative shareholder (as all shareholders have the same ex ante preferences and wealth), we can treat the CEO's bene…t as being the same as the loss to that representative shareholder. Proposition 1 suggests that when shareholders all have identical payo¤ structures, any focus on changing the rules of the game at the level of the corporation is misguided. Instead, a better place to focus one's e¤orts would be to understand whether voting patterns accurately re ‡ect the actual preferences of shareholders.
Heterogeneous Shareholders
We now turn to the more interesting case of shareholder heterogeneity. In order to understand optimal power-sharing arrangements when shareholders are heterogeneous, it is necessary to introduce more features into the model. Assume each shareholder i has a type i which is uniformly distributed on 0; . Shareholders all enjoy the same initial wealth, and their payo¤ is: The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Shareholders determine the degree of shareholder power V . 
Optimal Shareholder Power with no Agency Costs
First consider what happens when shareholders will not su¤er a loss from the CEO's opportunistic behavior, that is, when b = 0. Shareholders will want to approve the investment when the payo¤ from approval is greater than the payo¤ with no investment.
The investment will be approved when the fraction of shareholders in favor is at least as great as V (or when the fraction opposed is less than 1 V ). All shareholders with types i < a will be better o¤ if the investment does not take place, and will therefore vote against it. For approval, it must be the case that,
The LHS of equation (1) is just the cumulative distribution function for a uniform distribution, and is thus the proportion of total shareholders who will be disadvantaged if the investment is made. Rearranging, we have a necessary condition on the size of the exogenous shock a for shareholder approval: a > (1 V ).
We can now set up the shareholders optimization problem. The shareholder chooses the level of shareholder power V , to maximize her expected payo¤.
Equation (2) can be understood as follows. If the exogenous shock is too negative (that is, when A a < (1 V )), the investment will not be approved, and the shareholder receives 0. For (1 V ) a A, the investment will be approved, and the shareholder will receive an expected payo¤ of 2 + a where 2 is the average shareholder type. It is necessary for shareholders to use expected type since they solve for V before knowing their actual type. Solving equation (2), we get,
Thus we can now state the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 When contracts are complete (no agency costs) and shareholders are heterogeneous, the optimal level of shareholder power calls for a majority voting rule,
The optimal power-sharing rule does not depend on the degree of aggregate uncertainty, the size of the investment, or on the extent of shareholder con ‡ict. Rather, the allocation is a function of the distribution of shareholder types. Shareholders who are unsure of their type optimize for the average shareholder type. Since the distribution here is assumed to be symmetric, the average voter is identical to the median voter. In choosing a majority rule, shareholders grant an e¤ective power of veto to the median voter: in order for any investment recommendation to be implemented, it must pass muster with the median shareholder. Shareholders will agree to a majority voting rule even if ex post they are worse o¤. What is important is that this rule maximizes the shareholders payo¤ ex ante.
Majority voting is a intuitive solution, and one very familiar to political economists. 10 This result also resonates with prevailing practice in corporate law. Default voting rules generally require a majority of shareholders to vote in favor of a proposal before it will be approved. 11 As mentioned earlier, corporations are also adopting 10 See Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Rae (1969) , Neimi and Weisberg (ed. 1972), and Barbera and Jackson (2004) for discussions about why majority voting rules assume special importance in constitutions. 11 For example, section 7.25 of the Model Business Corporations Act states that so long as a quorum exists, an action (other than the election of directors) is approved if the votes cast in favor of the action exceed the votes cast against. Section 216 of the Delaware General Corporations Law also speci…es that a majority vote of shareholders present will su¢ ce for approval of corporate proposals other than the election of directors. majority voting rules for elections of individual directors, overriding the default plurality standards. 12 
Optimal Insulation with Agency Costs
So far I have demonstrated that shareholders are indi¤erent to voting rules when they all share the same type, and prefer majority rule when they di¤er from one another and agency costs are zero or negligible. What happens to optimal power-sharing rules once we account for the presence of agency costs? Understanding this case is important because advocates in favor of increasing shareholder power (and reducing management power) justify their positions on the basis that doing so is an e¤ective way of controlling agency costs. Note however that this question is only interesting if we assume shareholders are heterogeneous.
The CEO decides on her consumption of private bene…ts b knowing what the level of shareholder power V is, and shareholders take the CEO's optimization decision into account in determining the optimal voting rule. The shareholders cannot however change V once they observe b because the voting rule is part of the corporate charter and bylaws, and therefore not easy to alter. 13 The ability of shareholders to precommit to an action, and the fact that the CEO's action will at least partly be in response to the shareholders'choice means that the equilibrium of this game will be a Stackelberg equilibrium. The CEO's strategy will be a function of the shareholders' choice of V ; shareholders choose V to maximize their total payo¤, knowing the CEO's choice of b across all possible values of V .
Therefore shareholders need to determine the optimal voting rule V , not knowing their own type, but knowing the probability distribution over all types. The CEO needs to decide on the optimal amount of private bene…t to consume b , knowing that her choice will impact the level of shareholder power V . We solve the problem by backward induction.
An individual shareholder will not want to block an investment proposal if the expected return from the investment is higher than the return from not investing.
Therefore, a necessary condition for individual support is: Lemma 1 describes how the proportion of shareholders who are in favor of an investment will depend on factors both within the CEO's control and outside it. As the CEO's private bene…t grows, fewer shareholders will be in favor of the investment, and so the marginal shareholder (that is, the shareholder who is indi¤erent between voting for the investment or against) must be higher. On the other hand, when the CEO chooses investments with greater returns, more shareholders will bene…t if the investment is passed, and we therefore have the marginal shareholder type declining.
Finally, the larger and more positive the exogenous shock a, the more shareholders who will bene…t from the investment, and the lower is the type of the marginal shareholder.
In order to successfully block a proposal, a fraction of shareholders greater than 1 V must reject the investment. Therefore, the investment will only be made if the total fraction of shareholders with types i below b is less than 1 V . That is,
Rearranging, we can see that in order for the investment to be made, the following condition must be satis…ed.
From this condition, we can derive the likelihood that any investment will be approved. Using the fact that a is uniformly distributed, we can describe the probability of approval as follows,
Lemma 2 The probability that an investment will be approved is decreasing in the level of shareholder power V .
From Lemma 2 we can see that entrenching managers leads to more corporate investments. The probability of approval is maximized when managers are fully insulated and shareholders have minimal power as occurs when V = 0.
The CEO' s Optimization Problem The CEO solves for the private bene…t b that maximizes her expected payo¤, taking as given the level of shareholder power V . Her optimization problem can thus be written:
To understand equation (8), note that the CEO will receive a payo¤ of 0 if
that is, when the realization of a is small enough such that the investment will not be approved by the necessary threshold. For
a A, the CEO will receive a payo¤ of b. In these circumstances, a is large enough so that enough shareholders are in a position of preferring that the investment is made. The CEO chooses b to maximize her payo¤, knowing that her choice of b will also in ‡uence the proportion of shareholders voting in favor of the investment.
Solving, we have,
Proposition 3 The CEO's optimal private bene…t b is decreasing in the level of shareholder power V , and increasing in the size of the investment , the amount of aggregate uncertainty A, and the upper bound of shareholder types .
Proposition 3 demonstrates that as shareholders increase management entrenchment levels, CEO private bene…ts increase. The intuition behind the negative relationship between b and V is straightforward. The more likely it is an investment will be approved (or the harder it is to block an investment) -as happens the lower V is -the safer it is for the CEO to consume bene…ts at the expense of shareholders.
By having to keep a smaller number of shareholders happy, it is possible for the CEO to consume more without endangering the prospects of approval. In particular, it is shareholders with higher types whose approval the CEO needs. The CEO can consume greater bene…ts and still keep these shareholders in a position of being better o¤ with the investment than without. As the proportion of shareholder types the CEO needs to satisfy grows (that is, as V increases), by Lemma 1 the marginal shareholder b declines. This means that b must be lower in order to gain shareholder approval. The CEO will consume bene…ts right up to the point at which the size of the bene…t jeopardizes the investment's approval prospects. A smaller bene…t is preferable to the CEO than no bene…t at all, as is the case if shareholders block the proposal.
A similar intuition applies to the positive relationships between the private bene…t and the size of the investment, the degree of uncertainty and shareholder type. The optimal bene…t b is increasing in the size of the investment because the greater is , the more likely shareholders will be better o¤ with the investment made (since the greater is their payo¤, even with higher agency costs). CEOs can consume more yet shareholders will still approve investment proposals. Uncertainty about the size of the exogenous shock a increases b because a bigger a -more likely when
A grows -results in more shareholders with positive payo¤s, and therefore greater scope to safely consume private bene…ts without shareholders objecting. Finally, b
is increasing in the upper bound of shareholder type because the greater is , with a uniform distribution, the higher is the likelihood that shareholders will bene…t from a given investment.
The Shareholders'Optimization Problem In the model, even though they are unable to contract over it, the size of the private bene…t b is known to shareholders.
At the time of making the decision about power-sharing arrangements, shareholders can calculate the CEO's optimal bene…t function, and therefore take the CEO's actions into account in their own optimization decision. Note that because shareholders precommit to a voting regime, their decision about the extent of shareholder power will not be a direct function of the bene…t b. On the other hand, because they precommit, the CEO's decision will be a function of shareholders'choice. For this reason we can write b = b(V ):
Each shareholder operating behind a veil of ignorance (with the same ex-ante preferences) chooses the degree of shareholder power V to maximize their expected payo¤ 2 + a b(V ). Shareholders must solve the following optimization problem:
Investments do not take place when A < a <
and so shareholders receive a payo¤ of 0. For
ers receive a payo¤ depending on their type and the exogenous shock net of agency costs, a function of shareholder choice of V .
From equation (10) we can immediately see that shareholders face a tension in determining how much power to maintain for themselves. The size of the average payo¤ is increasing in V : this is because more shareholder power leads to a smaller private bene…t for the CEO (see Proposition 3 above). On the other hand, from the bounds of the integral, we see that the likelihood of receiving any payo¤ at all is decreasing in V since the bigger is V , the less likely the investment will be approved. Shareholders thus face a trade-o¤. Greater shareholder power results in lower agency costs (and therefore higher expected payo¤ in the event the investment takes place), but also a lower likelihood of the investment being approved. Lower levels of shareholder power means that the company will make more investments, but also that the CEO will consume larger private bene…ts at the expense of the shareholder.
Solving the shareholder's optimization problem, we have,
Proposition 4 The optimal level of shareholder power when shareholders are heterogeneous, can't costlessly exit from their investment, and can't contract over the CEO's consumption of private bene…ts is a supermajority voting regime, V = .
V is increasing in aggregate uncertainty A, and decreasing in the upper bound on shareholder type .
Higher levels of aggregate uncertainty result in higher levels of shareholder power.
Two reinforcing mechanisms are at work here. When A is bigger, more shareholders are likely to approve an investment, and therefore shareholder power can safely be higher since a greater number of shareholders will have preferences that exceed the marginal shareholder type. It is further desirable to increase shareholder power levels when A is higher because the CEO's optimal bene…t b is increasing in A. Since b decreases with V , shareholders prefer to increase V as much as possible -they can do this while still protecting the chances that bene…cial investments are approved.
In contrast, as the upper bound on shareholder type grows, the optimal level of shareholder power shrinks. Two competing forces are at work here. On the one hand, as grows, shareholder types are more likely to exceed the marginal shareholder type. This leads to higher shareholder power for the same reasons discussed above -greater power is preferable because it provides a way to control agency costs in circumstances where investments are likely to pass. On the other hand, as grows, so does shareholder heterogeneity and therefore potential con ‡ict. In deciding rules ex ante, shareholders are concerned to protect themselves in the event that they have high preferences ex post (more likely the higher is ) from shareholders with types below the marginal shareholder type. Shareholder concerns to not give other shareholders too much ability to block investment proposals push optimal shareholder power levels lower. Shareholders would prefer to make it harder for other shareholders to block CEO proposals (but only up to a point), even if it means that agency costs are higher as a result. Ultimately, it is this second e¤ect which dominates: as shareholder heterogeneity grows, all else equal shareholders will choose to have more insulated managers, giving themselves less power to block proposals.
The overall e¤ect however, occurs within a context where shareholders choose high levels of shareholder power to insure that they are protected in the event they have low types ex post. Thus, supermajorities are required in order for any proposal to be approved. It seems that shareholders operating under a veil of ignorance are willing to limit investments in order to reduce both agency costs, and harm that might 
Shareholder Power in Liquid Markets
The model outlined above is particularly relevant in circumstances when shareholders can't or won't sell their shares. It is clear that shareholders in private corporations face illiquid markets. Shareholders in public corporations also may be reluctant to sell in each and every circumstance they …nd themselves disadvantaged under a particular decision. They may be reluctant to sell at a loss knowing that they might recoup their investment in the future, or they may be reluctant to sell because of the transaction costs involved. We see many cases where shareholders unhappy with management decisions, do not choose to liquidate their investment. 14 However, when faced with a corporate decision that is welfare-reducing, many shareholders will simply follow the Wall Street Rule and sell their shares. This ability to exit shareholdings into a thick market has led some scholars to argue that shareholder power should be lower in public companies than in private companies ).
In this section, I investigate such claims by allowing shareholders to sell their shares in circumstances where they will be worse o¤ if the vote is approved. The timing of the game is unchanged except that the shareholder can choose to sell her shares after the exogenous shock a is realized (so she knows her payo¤) or she can hold on to her shares and vote. Shareholder payo¤s change slightly:
0 if no investment is made 0 if shareholders sell I make the assumption that the wealth of the shareholder is the same when she sells and when the investment is not approved. That is, the shareholder can exit at a price that leaves her indi¤erent between selling and holding on if no investment is made.
In essence then, if the shareholder's payo¤ ( i + a) b < 0, then she automatically sells. Simplifying prices in this way is justi…ed because if a shareholder were worse o¤ selling than retaining her shares, she would essentially be in the world described above with illiquid markets (although perhaps with slightly di¤erent payo¤s). On the other hand, if she is better o¤ selling even when she bene…ts from the investment, she can always make that choice without having to be concerned at all with the degree of power management has. As before, we can distinguish between cases where agency costs are positive and where agency costs are zero.
No Agency Costs
Assume b = 0. The analysis is basically unchanged except that now only shareholders with types i > a will hold onto their shares. All other shareholders will sell. This means that the average shareholder who votes has type a 2
. The shareholders's maximization problem becomes:
Solving for optimal insulation, we have V = 0.
Proposition 5
The optimal level of shareholder power when shareholders are heterogeneous, are able to sell their shares, and agency costs are zero is V = 0.
The ability of shareholders to sell their shares leads to a dramatically di¤erent result: shareholders will institute a system of limited shareholder power to protect themselves in the event the investment is wealth-enhancing. Shareholders no longer need be concerned with maintaining some veto power over management proposals because they are able to easily exit unpro…table investments. When shareholder power is minimal and agency costs are zero, there is a sorting among shareholders leading to reduced levels of heterogeneity and hence of con ‡ict. All investments are approved.
Positive Agency Costs
In public companies, the separation of ownership and control gives rise to well-known agency problems. Therefore, it is necessary to take agency costs into account in the design of power sharing rules. Assume b > 0. The CEO's bene…t function is un-
. However the shareholders optimization problem changes. Since all shareholders who are worse o¤ if the investment take place will sell -that is, those shareholders with types i < b a -it must be the case that the remaining voting shareholder has an expected type
The optimization problem becomes:
Solving, we have
Proposition 6 The optimal level of shareholder power when shareholders are heterogeneous, are able to sell their shares but can't contract over the CEO's consumption of private bene…ts is V = 1 3
. V is increasing in aggregate uncertainty A, and decreasing in the upper bound on shareholder type .
As before, the optimal level of shareholder power is higher as soon as one takes into account the fact that agency costs may be endogenous -that is, the private bene…ts consumed by the CEO will depend on how much veto power shareholders are granted. Proposition 6 demonstrates that it is not the case that shareholders prefer to ignore agency costs altogether, and instead will tailor the level of shareholder power to control agency costs.
An Illustrative Example
The results above illustrate how shareholders'inability to sell leads them to allocate more power to themseves in an e¤ort to manage shareholder con ‡ict. I show that it is not at all necessary to assume that once shareholders gain access to a liquid market for their shares, that all con ‡ict disappears. Rather, liquidity is an e¤ective way to manage shareholder con ‡ict while ensuring that corporations can continue to make worthwhile investments. Liquidity however, does not solve con ‡icts between shareholders and managers.
When investments are liquid more management proposals will be approved because unhappy shareholders will sell before voting. When markets are illiquid, it will be the case that either many more proposals will be voted down by unhappy shareholders, or there will be high costs of negotiation among shareholders to reach a satisfactory agreement. As the capital needs of corporations increase, and the shareholder base diversi…es, the costs of minority veto power and shareholder negotiation become prohibitive. Liquid markets are thus a mechanism to overcome shareholder con ‡ict.
For …rms with shareholders that are relatively homogeneous with no capital constraints, under this theory there is not much rationale for going public. In these …rms, there is little need for costly mechanisms to deal with shareholder con ‡ict such as supermajority provisions (giving minority shareholders veto power and limiting management's power to make …rm investments), voting agreements and trusts and arbitration. For …rms however, where either the existing shareholder base has strong disagreements about the best course of action, or where the need to raise more capital for future operations will have the e¤ect of bringing in shareholders with divergent interests, going public can ensure that management proposals are likely to be embraced. Going public presents a much less costly alternative to shareholder con ‡ict resolution than others available, and one under which all shareholders, regardless of their type, will be better o¤. , which means that in order for an investment to be approved, at least 5 6 of shareholders must be in favor. The CEO's bene…t is b = 2 3 , the probability of the investment taking place is 1 3 , and the shareholders'expected payo¤ is 1 3 .
Several points can be gleaned from this simple numerical example. First, granting little protection for the CEO does not mean that no investments will be made, although note that the number of investments will be much lower than if shareholder power were lower. Second, very high levels of shareholder power do not completely eliminate agency costs, although giving more power to shareholders to block management proposals signi…cantly reduces them. respectively. Increasing shareholder power above the optimum leaves both shareholders and managers worse o¤. Even though the CEO's private bene…t is lower in the event an investment is approved, far fewer investments are made (the probability of approval drops to 1 4 ). This reduced likelihood of investment harms not only the CEO, but also the shareholders themselves.
By contrast, consider what happens if shareholder power is decreased, say to
. The probability the investment is approved increases to 5 12 . Shareholder and CEO expected payo¤s are now . The CEO consumes a private bene…t of 1, the probability of the investment taking place is 1 2 and the expected bene…t for shareholders is 3 8 . This simple example highlights two salient points. First, we can see that a majority voting rule is preferable to one where the CEO enjoys full power. When V = 0 the CEO takes a greater private bene…t of 3 2 , the probability of the investment being approved is 3 4 ; and the expected shareholder payo¤ declines to 9 32 . Agency costs provide a justi…cation of maintaining some shareholder veto power, even while this veto power diminishes the probability of investments occurring.
Second, compare the welfare of shareholders when they have access to liquid markets to when they cannot exit from their investment in the corporation. Both the expected payo¤ for shareholders as well as the CEO's private bene…t are higher.
This increase in shareholder welfare is a function of the fact that unhappy shareholders can costlessly sell, so will be no worse o¤ when the investment takes place.
Shareholders accordingly do not need to protect themselves from each other to the same degree so shareholder power will be lower. Lower shareholder power increases both the likelihood of the investment being approved and the amount of private bene…t consumed. However, even though agency costs are higher in a liquid market, shareholders are still better o¤. Liquidity provides an outlet for shareholder con ‡ict leading shareholders to better outcomes.
Conclusion
In this paper, I present a number of di¤erent results regarding the optimality of power-sharing arrangements between shareholders and managers, summarized in the table below. These results demonstrate how one can reach very di¤erent conclusions depending on the assumptions one makes. Shareholders will take each of these considerations into account in crafting power-sharing arrangements. In deciding on the optimal allocation of power in a …rm, shareholders face two major trade-o¤s. The …rst trade-o¤ is concerned with minority veto power and is completely resolved when shareholders are able to easily exit from their investment in a …rm. When shareholders cannot liquidate their investment, increasing shareholder power is bene…cial in that it makes it easier for shareholders to block corporate investments that do not bene…t them. On the other hand, greater shareholder power can be costly in that those investments that would bene…t a majority of shareholders could be blocked by the minority of shareholders who would be harmed. Since shareholders don't know their actual type at the time of determining the optimal level of shareholder power, they need to balance each of these considerations.
It is precisely this trade-o¤ which leads to the result that shareholders choose majority voting requirements. However, as soon as one takes into consideration the fact that in many cases unhappy shareholders can simply liquidate their shareholding at a negligible cost, concerns about minority veto power disappear. Shareholders no longer face the trade-o¤ described above and hence will allocate more power to managers.
The second trade-o¤ involves agency costs, and thus is present regardless of shareholders ability to sell their shares. Managers will condition their consumption of private bene…ts on how much power shareholders have to block managerial recommendations. Shareholders in deciding how much power to allocate to themselves will take the manager's optimization decision into account. The fact that agency costs are endogenous in this way, leads shareholders to allocate more power to themselves.
Concerns about minority veto however place a lower bound on how much power shareholders are willing to assume.
Finally, this paper stakes out a middle ground between proponents and opponents of increasing shareholder power. In choosing rules of power allocation, shareholders wish to tie their own hands, possibly maintain some veto power, and control managerial agency costs. I demonstrate that it is not necessary to assume that shareholders are homogeneous to justify an increase in shareholder power. In support of Bebchuk, I show that shareholders will choose corporate governance rules in an e¤ort to limit agency costs even at the expense of the corporation making fewer investments. In support of those who argue that all decision making should be centralized within the …rm, I show that when shareholders are able to easily sell their shares, they are prepared to grant signi…cantly more power to managers.
